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1. Introduction
A central Tractarian thesis is that of the logical independence of the elementary propositions, the atoms. 
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I will make precise what the thesis is, and show that Wittgenstein 
endorses it (section 1). Second, I will identify a concept of logical dependence in terms of which logical 
independence can be defined (section 2). And finally, I will show that these notions of logical dependence 
and independence fail to capture certain explanatory links between propositions, and I will then try to 
refine the previous definitions in order to end up with concepts which do capture such links (section 3). 
Part of these matters have been dealt with by (Simons, 1981). But as I will show, Simons' investigation is 
mistaken on independence, and—as a consequence—incomplete on dependence.
2. Independence
The aim is here to make precise sense of the claim that some given propositions are logically independent, 
and to show that Wittgenstein held that the atoms are independent in this sense.
Some preliminary definitions will be useful. Where S is a set of propositions, we define a state–function 
on S as a function taking each element of S into itself or its negation; and we shall  say that a set of 
propositions Σ is a state–description1 on S iff it is the image of S by some state–function on S, i.e. iff there 
is  a  state–function  ψ on S such that  Σ={ψ(p):p∈S}.  We shall  use  Σ ∇ S  to  mean  that  Σ is  a  state–
description on S. Note that by definition, there is one and only one state–description on  ∅, namely  ∅ 
itself. We take as primitive the notions of logical possibility (◊) and logical necessity ([]), and we assume 
they are interdefinable in the usual way. Where S is a set of propositions, T(S) is taken to mean that all the 
members of S are true (so that in particular, it is trivially the case that T(∅)); and where p is a proposition, 
T(p) will be short for T({p}).
With all this in hands, we define the following notions of independence (S is any set of propositions, and n 
any integer):2
D1   the members of S are independent iffdf ∀Σ ∇ S  ◊ T(Σ);  
D2   the  members  of  S are  n–independent  iffdf  ∀ T  ⊆ S  (#  T = n  ⇒ the  members  of  T  are 
1The phrase is Carnap's, but my definition differs from his.
2For reasons of formal homogeneity, we shall admit that S may be empty or contain only one element—though of 
course when we say that some things are independent in some given respect, we have in mind a collection of at least 
two things. For the same reason, we do not exclude n=0 or n=1, though 0–independence and 1–independence are 
somehow uninteresting cases. The members of any set of propositions are 0–independent in any case, and the 1–
independence of some propositions means that each of them is contingent: each can be true and can be false.
1Published in R. Haller and K. Puhl (eds.), 
Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy. A Reassessment after 50 years : 
Proceedings of the 24th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 12th to 18th August 2001, Vol. 1, 2001
independent); 
D3   the members of S are finitely independent iffdf for every integer n, the members of S are n–
independent.
It is easy to see that m–independence entails n–independence if m ≥ n. In case m < n, we may have m–
independence without n–independence. Assume for instance that p, q and r are independent propositions. 
Then p, q and r ∨ (¬ p ∧ ¬ q) are 2–independent, but not 3–independent.
Independence entails finite independence, but the converse does not hold unless certain conditions on the 
propositions concerned are imposed. For e.g. assume that we have an infinite number of names a0, a1, ..., 
ai, ..., and consider the set S constituted by (1) the proposition 'there is a finite number of φs', (2) for each 
integer i, the proposition 'ai is φ', and (3) for all integers i andj such that i ≠ j, the proposition 'ai ≠ aj'. Then 
the members of S are finitely independent, but not independent tout court. Among the conditions on a set 
S  of  propositions  which  make  the  finite  independence  of  its  members  entail  their  independence  is 
finiteness. Another one which will be of interest to us is that all the members of S be atomic.3
For  any  integer  n,  the  number  of  distributions  of  truth–values  over  any  given  n  distinct  atomic 
propositions is the number of state–descriptions drawn from these propositions, namely 2n. Thus, saying 
that the number of logically possible distributions of truth–values over them is 2n is equivalent to saying 
that every distribution of truth–values over them is logically possible—which by our definition means that 
these propositions are independent.  In the  Tractatus,  Wittgenstein claims that the number of logically 
possible distributions of truth–values among any n distinct elementary propositions is 2n:
With regard to the existence of n atomic facts there are Kn = ( )∑
=
n
n
0v ν
 possibilities.
It is possible for all combinations of atomic facts to exist; and the others not to exist (4.27).
To these combinations correspond the same number of possibilities of the truth—and falsehood—of n 
elementary propositions (4.28).
Therefore, Wittgenstein endorses the claim that any n distinct atoms are logically independent, and thus 
that the atoms are finitely independent. So given that for the atoms finite independence is equivalent to 
independence, Wittgenstein holds that the atoms are independent tout court.
As a conclusion to this section, let me note that (Simons, 1981) attributes to Wittgenstein the thesis that 
the  atoms  are  pairwise  independent,  that  is,  2–independent,  and  claims  that  this  is  the logical 
independence thesis of theTractatus. According to the previous discussion, thus, Simons is right on the 
first claim, not on the second. For Wittgenstein not only accepts that the atoms are pairwise independent: 
as we just saw, he endorses the (much) stronger claim that the atoms are independent tout court.
3. Dependence
The question we are facing now is that of identifying a concept of logical dependence, in terms of which 
logical independence may be defined. The idea will be that some given propositions are independent iff 
3The fact that finite independence does not entails independence is qualified by logicians as a "non–compactness'' 
fact. First order logic is compact: for sets of first–order propositions (in particular, for sets of atomic sentences), 
finite independence entails independence tout court. In our example, it is the quantifier 'there are finitely many'—
which is not first–order definable—which creates problems. It is not clear to me whether Wittgenstein accepts such 
quantifiers in his "meaningful'' language.
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none of them depends on the others. Logical dependence will be defined in terms of some concept of 
partial  logical  determination.  My approach is  quite  different  from that  of  (Simons,  1981),  and in  an 
important sense more complete: for Simons only deals with pairwise independence and related concepts of 
1–1 dependence.
Thus, let us first define  logical determination. Propositions p1, p2, ... will be said to logically determine 
proposition q in case each truth–value assignment to p1, p2, ... "fixes'' the truth–value of q. This idea can be 
made more precise as follows (as before S is any set of propositions, and p is any proposition):
D4   the members of S determine p iffdf ∀ Σ ∇ S, not both ◊ T(Σ∪{p}) and ◊ T(Σ∪{¬ p}).
In case S=∅, 'the members of S determine p' means that p is necessarily true or necessarily false.
There are certainly many ways partial logical determination could then be defined. Here is one which I 
shall adopt:
D5   the members of S partly determine p iffdf ∃Σ ∇ S, not both ◊ T(Σ∪{p}) and ◊ T(Σ∪{¬ p}).
That is, propositions p1, p2, ... partly determine proposition q in case some truth–value assignments to p1, 
p2, ... logically fix the truth–value of q. Of course, determination is stronger than partial determination, and 
there may be cases of partial determination without determination  tout court: for p and q independent, 
p ∧ q only partly determine p.
In some use of the verb 'to depend', something depends of some other things iff the latter at least partly 
determine the former (suppose for instance I decide to go to a party with Manu and plan to spend the 
whole night there if she does, without planning anything for the case she does not; then, my decision about 
my staying the whole night or not is partly determined by her decision on the same topic; and we can say, 
for that reason, that my decision depends on her's). Logical dependence is then defined as the converse of 
partial logical determination:
D6   p depends on the members of S iffdf the members of S partly determine p,
and we naturally put:
D7   p is independent from the members of S iffdf p does not depend on the members of S.
One can then verify that for every set of propositions S, the members of S are independent iff every 
member of S is independent from the others. In case S ≠ ∅, this is also equivalent to: some member of S is 
independent from the others.1 We thus have what we were looking for.
4. Refinements
1(1) Proof that the members of S are independent ⇒ each member of S is independent from the others. Suppose some 
member q of S is dependent on S-{q}. This means that some state–description Σ on S-{q} is such that not–◊ T(Σ∪
{q}) or not–◊ T(Σ∪{¬ q}). Suppose not–◊ T(Σ∪{q}), and let Σ' be Σ∪{q} (the case where not–◊ T(Σ∪{¬ q}) leads 
to the same conclusion). Since Σ' is a state–description on S, this means that the members of S are not independent. 
(2) Proof that some member of S is independent from the others ⇒ the members of S are independent. Suppose that 
the members of S are not independent,  i.e. that some state–description  Σ on S is such that not–◊ T(Σ). Then in 
particular, S ≠ ∅. Let q be in S, and let Σ' be any state–description on S-{q} such that Σ'⊆ Σ (there are such state–
descriptions). Then either Σ=Σ'∪{q} or Σ=Σ'∪{¬ q}. In any case, we see that q is not independent from S-{q}.
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Perhaps  the  above  notions  of  independence,  dependence  and  determination capture  important  logical 
relationships between propositions, and in particular some relationships Wittgenstein himself took to be 
important. But it is my view that they fail to capture some other interesting logical ties, which we would 
actually also express by using the vocabulary of dependence and determination.
In one sense of the verb "to determine'', by 'the truth–value of p determines the truth–value of q', we intend 
to express two things: first that once the truth–value of p is given, there is no room for the truth–value of q 
to vary; and second that whichever truth–value q may have, it has it in virtue of the fact that p has the 
truth–value  it  has.  Call  the  first  aspect  the  fixing  component of  determination,  and  the  second  its 
explanation  component.  Logical  determination  as  defined  above  captures  the  fixing  component  of 
determination. But it is easy to see that it does not capture its explanation component. In fact, consider the 
following consequences of the above definition of determination (p and q are any propositions):
• p determines q ∨ ¬ q;
• p determines q ∧ ¬ q;
• p ∧ p determines p;
• ¬¬ p determines p.
Where q is any proposition, it should be clear that it is not the case that for every proposition p, q ∨ ¬ q 
has the truth–value it  has in virtue of the fact that p has the truth–value it  has;  some would even be 
inclined to say that the truth of q ∨ ¬ q is not to be explained by the truth of any proposition whatsoever. 
Similar considerations hold of the case of q ∧ ¬ q. All the same, we do not want to say that proposition p 
is, say, true in virtue of the fact that ¬¬ p or p ∧ p is true; in fact, we are inclined to say the opposite, viz. 
that ¬¬ p and p ∧ p, if true, are true because p is.
These  considerations  call  for  defining  a  concept  of  logical  determination  with  both  a  fixing  and  an 
explanation component. There are plausibly several ways to do so. The one I shall sketch here is in terms 
of  a primitive  explanation predicate  ♦:  where  S is  a  set  of  propositions  and p a proposition,  S  ♦ p 
expresses that p is true in virtue of the fact that (some of) the members of S are all true. We understand ♦ 
so that it satisfies the following axioms:
A1   [] (S ♦ p ⇒ T(S) and T(p)); 
A2   ◊ (S ♦ p) ⇒ [](T(S) ⇒ S ♦ p).
We then  define  the  new concept  of  determination,  determination',  by stating  that  the  members  of  S 
determine' q iff in any logically possible circumstance, q has the truth–value it has in virtue of the fact that 
(some of) the members of S have the truth–values they have. This may be formally rendered as follows:
D8   the members of S determine' q iffdf [] ((T(q) ⇒ ∃Σ ∇ S  Σ ♦ q) and (T(¬ q) ⇒ ∃Σ ∇ S  Σ ♦ ¬ 
q)).
It is easy to check that:1
1Using the fact that for every proposition q,  [](T(q) or T(¬ q)) and [](T(q)  ⇒ not–T(¬q)), we can prove by basic 
modal reasoning that the members of S determine' q iff [] (∃Σ ∇ S (Σ ♦ q  or Σ ♦ ¬ q)). Now, using the fact that for 
every set of propositions S, [](∃!Σ ∇ S T(Σ)) and axiom (A2), we can prove that [] (∃Σ ∇ S (Σ ♦ q or Σ ♦ ¬ q)) iff ∀
Σ ∇ S  [](T(Σ) ⇒ Σ ♦ q or Σ ♦ ¬ q).
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T1   the members of S determine' q iff ∀Σ ∇ S [](T(Σ) ⇒ Σ ♦ q or Σ ♦ ¬ q).
One can then prove that determination' entails determination.2
Of course, the new concept of determination escapes the problems met by the old one. We cannot prove 
that any tautology or contradiction is logically determined' by any proposition whatsoever. And moreover, 
under the assumption that it is logically impossible for a tautology or a contradiction to owe its truth–value 
to the fact that these or those propositions have such and such truth–values, one can prove that tautologies 
and contradictions are logically undetermined'. All the same, we cannot prove that p ∧ p determines p and 
¬¬ p  determines  p  for  any  arbitrary  proposition  p.  Actually,  under  the  plausible  assumption  that 
proposition p never owes its truth–value to that of p ∧ p or ¬¬ p, it follows that p is logically determined' 
neither by p ∧ p nor by ¬¬ p.
Partial determination' can be defined by stating that the members of S partly determine' q iff in some 
logically possible  circumstance,  q  has  the  truth–value  it  has  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  (some of)  the 
members of S have the truth–values they have. The formal rendering is then:
D9   the members of S partly determine' q iffdf ◊ ((T(q) ⇒ ∃Σ ∇ S  Σ ♦ q) and (T(¬ q) ⇒ ∃Σ ∇ S  Σ ♦ 
¬ q)).
It is easy to check that:
T2   the members of S partly determine' q ⇒ ∃Σ ∇ S [](T(Σ) ⇒ Σ ♦ q or Σ ♦ ¬ q).
One can then also prove that partial determination' entails partial determination.
Finally, we may define dependence', the independence' of a proposition from the members  of a set of 
propositions  and  the  independence'  of  the  members  of  a  set  of  propositions  in  terms  of  partial 
determination',  in  the  same  way  as  before.  Independence'  will  then  turn  out  to  be  weaker  than 
independence; and so, admitting that the atoms are independent will commit one to the view that they are 
independent' as well.
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